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RESPONSE TO APPELLEE'S 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Masterson Parties1 take issue with the accuracy of several statements made by 
Donald and Jeanette in their Statement of the Nature of the Case, as well as with the 
relevance of these statements. 
Donald and Jeanette cite to several areas in the record to demonstrate that 
Cleo, the mother, had previously told some of her children that she thought that Arnold 
gave the property to Donald and Jeanette because they had paid off a minimal mortgage 
on the farm. However, these statements of Cleo, obtained second hand through her 
children, were made decades after the 1967 transfer, when Cleo was in her 80's and 90's. 
More importantly, Cleo's understanding of the transfer was insufficient, in the trial 
court's eyes, to overcome Arnold's statements made contemporaneously with the 
transfer, both in written and oral records, concerning his intent in making the transfer to 
Donald and Jeanette to hold in trust for the family. Donald and Jeanette's citations to this 
evidence seem to be asking this Court to weigh the evidence again, rather than accord 
deference to the findings of fact made by the trial court. If Donald and Jeanette wished to 
demonstrate that these statements are sufficient to show that the trial court's findings are 
clearly erroneous, then Donald and Jeanette would have had to marshal the evidence, 
which they did not do. Moreover, the issue in this appeal is whether the Court of Appeals 
1
 For clarity, Appellants Arnold Dwayne Rawlings and Paulette Rawlings will be referred 
to as "Dwayne" and Appellants Theron LaRell Rawlings, Bryce C. Rawlings, and Carol 
Lynn R. Masterson will be referred to as the "Masterson Parties". Appellees Donald 
Rawlings and Jeanette Rawlings will be referred to as "Donald and Jeanette". 
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was in error in issuing its ruling, not whether the trial court was in error. Utah County v. 
Butler, 2008 UT 12, H 19, 179 P.3d 775. As such, Donald and Jeanette's reliance on this 
evidence distracts from the real issues of the case and does not further the resolution of 
this matter. 
Donald and Jeanette also recite evidence presented concerning their alleged payoff 
of the mortgage on the farm. Dwayne and the Masterson Parties alleged in trial that the 
checks presented into evidence were actually used to pay off their own loan with the 
same bank, and not to pay off a mortgage on the farm. (Record p. 1570). What Donald 
and Jeanette fail to point out is that Jeanette admitted in court to altering the checks to 
appear as if they were used to pay on Arnold's account after this litigation was instituted. 
(Record p. 1570). Consequently the trial court found Donald and Jeanette's evidence 
regarding pay off of the mortgage as "unpersuasive." (Record p. 1537, 1570). 
In addition, Donald and Jeanette argue that Dwayne and the Masterson Parties 
"are free to not believe Donald's testimony but they are not free to misrepresent it." 
Donald and Jeanette's allegations that the Petitioners have misrepresented the evidence is 
false, distracting and irrelevant. Petitioners have already recited the relevant testimony as 
to Donald's knowledge that the transfer was to be in trust. More important are the 
findings of fact entered by the trial court. Truly, the Petitioners and the trial court were 
free not to believe Donald's testimony, and none did. The trial court specifically noted 
that both Donald and Jeanette's testimony was "unpersuasive." (Record p. 1536-38, 
1570). 
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Finally, Donald and Jeanette seek to characterize this dispute as being one of 
"ownership of real property" between Petitioners and Respondents. In doing so, Donald 
and Jeanette seek to confuse the question of whether Dwayne and the Masterson Parties 
are challenging the validity of the 1967 deed or whether they are acknowledging the 
validity of the deed and seeking to impose a constructive trust. Donald and Jeanette seek 
to benefit from the characterization of this case as a challenge to the validity of the deed 
because of statute of limitations concerns which will be addressed below. The Masterson 
Parties wish to emphasize that they do not challenge the 1967 deed as conveying legal 
title to Donald and Jeanette. The 1967 deed is valid. The question is whether this deed 
was intended to convey the property in trust, or not. The trial court made factual findings 
that Arnold intended to convey the farm in trust, to be held for the family. (Record p. 
1561, 1574). 
ARGUMENT 
Donald and Jeanette raise several arguments in response to Dwayne and the 
Masterson Parties. In sum, these arguments are: (1) that equitable constructive trusts 
only have application when a confidential relationship has been breached, that the 
restatements cited by Dwayne are inapplicable to the facts at hand, and that the Court of 
Appeals got the law right on this issue; (2) that the statute of limitations began to run in 
1967 with the delivery of the deed, and that the discovery rule does not apply to toll the 
statute of limitations; (3) that, assuming that Arnold did create an express constructive 
trust, Arnold's creation of this trust was only for himself and an interest in the trust did 
not pass to the children; (4) that the standard of review is for correctness and that the 
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Masterson Parties violated rules of professional conduct for not adopting this argument; 
and (5) that Donald and Jeanette had no duty to marshal before the Court of Appeals 
because they did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence below. 
As will be articulated below, these arguments fail because: (1) case law clearly 
establishes that constructive trusts can be imposed in a variety of situations including the 
facts presented in this case; (2) the parties concede that the 1967 deed is valid and 
conveyed legal title to Donald and Jeanette and the dispute centers on whether equitable 
title was retained for the benefit of the family, thereby requiring the imposition of a 
constructive trust and implicating the application of the discovery rule to the facts of this 
case; (3) both the findings of fact and the evidence below clearly establish that Arnold 
intended to create a trust for the benefit of the family, not just for himself; (4) the 
standard of review for the application of the facts to an equitable legal theory is an abuse 
of discretion standard, and the Masterson Parties have not violated ethics rules by simply 
not anticipating or adopting Donald and Jeanette's novel argument; and (5) a simple 
review of the briefing below clearly establishes that Donald and Jeanette challenged the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings of the trial court, which means that 
Donald and Jeanette had the duty to marshal the evidence. This Court should therefore 
reverse the Court of Appeals and uphold the ruling of the trial court. 
Although Donald and Jeanette have addressed several of Dwayne and the 
Masterson Parties' arguments, there are several other arguments that Donald and Jeanette 
have failed to address. These arguments therefore remain undisputed and un-rebutted. 
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Because the Court of Appeals erred in these respects, this Court should reverse the Court 
of Appeals on these issues alone. 
I. APPELLEE'S FAIL TO DISPUTE OR REBUT KEY ARGUMENTS 
AND THIS COURT CAN REVERSE THE COURT OF APPEALS ON 
THESE ISSUES ALONE. 
Donald and Jeanette have failed to dispute, rebut, or even address several key 
arguments raised by the Appellants in the briefing. Namely, the Masterson Parties 
devoted substantial briefing to the fact that the Court of Appeals failed to construe the 
trial court's findings of fact in favor of the trial court's ruling. See State v. A House and 
1.37 Acres of Real Property located at 392 South, 886 P.2d 534, 535 (Utah 1994); Ockey 
v. Lehmer, 2008 UT 37, ]f 34, 189 P.3d 51. The case law is so extensive on this issue that 
this Court has even had opportunity to reiterate this rule in a constructive trust case. 
Carnesecca v. Carnesecca, 572 P.2d 708, 710 (Utah 1977). The Court of Appeals' ruling 
ignores this requirement, and its failure to follow precedent led the Court of Appeals to 
issue an erroneous ruling in this matter. Donald and Jeanette have completely neglected 
this argument and its implications and have not briefed this issue at all. 
Donald and Jeanette have also failed to dispute or rebut Appellants' argument that 
the decision of the Court of Appeals ignores precedent in Parks v. Zions First Nat. Bank, 
673 P.2d 590, 597 (Utah 1983), and Haws v. Jensen, 209 P.2d 229, 232 (Utah 1949). 
Both of these cases clearly indicate that there are unlimited circumstances in which a 
constructive trust may be imposed in equity. The Court of Appeals' decision limiting 
constructive trusts to two narrow theories is in conflict with these precedents. Donald 
and Jeanette have failed to address or even cite to Parks or Haws. 
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In addition, Donald and Jeanette have failed to address the argument that the Court 
of Appeals changed the legal standard by which this case was to be evaluated and ruled 
rather than remanded. Case law requires that when the legal standard by which a case is 
to be judged changes, the case should be remanded for findings of fact under the new 
legal theory. But rather than remanding the case for findings of fact consistent with the 
new legal theory, the Court of Appeals used the existing findings to support its 
conclusion that the findings did not support the legal theory, in violation of binding 
precedent. See Moler v. CW Management Corp., 2008 UT 46, \ 14, 190 P3d 1250. 
Donald and Jeanette have also failed to brief this issue. 
Donald and Jeanette's failure to dispute, rebut or even address the pivotal 
arguments that the Court of Appeals' erred in failing to construe findings in favor of the 
trial court ruling, in failing to follow or acknowledge Parks and Haws, and in failing to 
remand, leaves this Court with only Appellants' arguments on these issues. Therefore, 
setting aside the other arguments which the parties have raised, these arguments are 
sufficient in and of themselves for this Court to reverse the decision of the Court of 
Appeals and uphold the decision of the trial court, especially because Donald and 
Jeanette have failed to dispute or rebut them. 
II. THE FINDINGS OF FACT ESTABLISH THAT THE CONSTRUCTIVE 
TRUST CREATED BY ARNOLD WAS MEANT TO BENEFIT THE 
FAMILY, NOT JUST ARNOLD RAWLINGS. 
Donald and Jeanette argue that even if there was an express constructive trust 
created, that this trust could only have been for the benefit of Arnold himself, and not for 
the family. This argument would only carry weight if it were consistent with the 
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evidence and the findings of fact made by the district court. It is not consistent with 
either the evidence or the findings, and should be disregarded. Rather, the evidence and 
the findings of fact demonstrate that Arnold's express intent was that the property was to 
be held for the family, and not just for himself. 
Arnold had been diagnosed with what was eventually terminal cancer. (Record p. 
1451, Trans. Vol. I, 45:20-25; 46:1-9; 47:5-13). Thus, Arnold expressed his intent to 
transfer the property to be held for the family, and not just for himself. The evidence is 
definitive on this point. On May 24, 1967, when LaRell Rawlings arrived at the signing 
of the deed, Arnold specifically said to him, "This is not Donald's property. This is the 
family's." (Record p. 1451, Trans. Vol. I, 60:10-11). In a conversation with Dwayne and 
Donald just a few days before the signing of the 1967 deed, Arnold stated that the 
property was going to be put "in Donald's name, and it would be held for the family." 
(Record p. 1451, Trans. Vol. II, 381:10-11; 388:25). After the transfer, Donald treated 
the property as being held for the family, deeding portions of the property to his brother 
Dwayne without consideration (Record p. 1574-75) and distributing income received 
through boundary disputes on the farm to all of the siblings (Record p. 1562). The trial 
court adopted this evidence in its findings and determined that constructive trust property 
was held "for and on behalf of the family members." (Record p. 1574). And that the 
evidence "demonstrate^] the farm as a family farm." (Record p. 1561). 
Thus, Donald and Jeanette's argument that even if an express trust was created, it 
could only be in favor of Arnold, is factually incorrect. The trial court found that the 
transfer was intended by Arnold to have Donald and Jeanette hold the farm for the entire 
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family, and not just for himself. Because Arnold intended the transfer to be in favor of 
the family, the trial court's imposition of a constructive trust in favor of the entire family 
was correct, and the Court of Appeals' decision should be reversed. 
III. EQUITABLE CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS ARE NOT LIMITED TO 
BREACH OF CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP CASES. 
Donald and Jeanette argue that the trial court was in error because its finding that 
Arnold had no intent to convey his ownership rights in the property failed to address the 
issue of whether a constructive trust existed. Donald and Jeanette insist that a breach of a 
confidential relationship is necessary for the imposition of a constructive trust. In fact, 
the Court of Appeals' own decision belies this argument. The Court of Appeals found 
that an express trust need not be founded on a wrongful act like the breach of a 
confidential relationship. Rawlings v. Rawlings, 2008 UT App 478, \ 14, 200 P.3d 662. 
The trial court's finding that Arnold did not intend to transfer his beneficial interest in the 
property directly supports the imposition of an express constructive trust. Moreover, case 
law is very clear that constructive trusts can be imposed in more circumstances than just 
the breach of a confidential relationship. Utah case law clearly demonstrates that 
constructive trusts can also be imposed in cases of an express trust (Ashton v. Ashton, 733 
P.2d 147, 151 (Utah 1987)), or through breach of a fiduciary relationship (Carnesecca v. 
Carnesecca, 572 P.2d 708, 710 (Utah 1977); Ashton, 733 P.2d at 151), through fraud or 
misrepresentation, (Lakeside Lumber Products, Inc. v. Evans, 2005 UT App 87, ^ f 15, 110 
P.3d 154; Lawley v. Hickenlooper, 212 P. 526, 529 (Utah 1923)), by receipt of property 
through mistake (Wilcox v. Anchor Wate, Co., 2007 UT 39, ^ 35, 164 P.3d 353) and 
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through other non-delineated circumstances in which equity so requires {Parks, 673 P.2d 
at 597; Haws, 209 P.2d at 232; Acott v. Tomlinson, 337 P.2d 720, 724 (Utah 1959); 
Parduhn v. Bennett, 2002 UT 93, t 17, 61 P.3d 982). Donald and Jeanette's legal 
arguments on this issue are simply in error. 
IV. THE PARTIES AGREE THAT THE 1967 DEED CONVEYED LEGAL 
TITLE AND THAT A FOUR YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
APPLIES IN THIS CASE, BUT CASE LAW ALSO REQUIRES THAT 
THE STATUTE IS TOLLED UNTIL THE TRUST IS REPUDIATED. 
Donald and Jeanette have repeatedly tried to paint this dispute as an attack on the 
validity of the deed signed by Arnold in 1967. Donald and Jeanette benefit from this 
erroneous characterization of this case because a direct attack on a deed is governed by a 
four year statute of limitations which begins to run when the deed is delivered. Thus 
Donald and Jeanette argue that because the deed was signed and delivered in 1967, the 
statute of limitations has long since passed. This argument might carry weight if the 
Petitioners were attacking the validity of the 1967 deed. They are not. Rather the 
validity of the deed in transferring legal title to Donald and Jeanette is not in question. 
As constructive trustees, Donald and Jeanette hold legal title to the property. Rather, the 
dispute centers on whether Donald and Jeanette hold the property "for the family", or 
whether they hold it in fee simple. When a constructive trust concerning family property 
LS at issue, the pivotal question is whether the discovery rule applies to toll the statute of 
limitations until the constructive trust is repudiated. 
As articulated before, normally the application of the discovery rule to toll a 
statute of limitations requires the court to conduct a balancing test. Snow v. Rudd, 2000 
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l | f 20, f^ 11, 998 P.2d 262. However, in the case of the imposition of a constructive trust 
oVfrr property in dispute between family members, a court has "already conducted this 
balancing test." Id. Thus Snow specifically holds that in constructive trust cases 
ii^\|olving family members of family estates, the discovery rule presumptively applies. 
7411 Because the discovery rule presumptively applies, the question before the trial court 
w^f: When was the constructive trust repudiated? The trial court found that the trust was 
ndtll reoudiated until the fall of 1993, three and one half years before suit to impose a 
cc^stmctive trust was filed, and well within the four year statute of limitations. (Record 
p. !|561). Rather than address or brief the applicability of the discovery rule, Donald and 
Je&iette seek to distract the court by simply characterizing this case as a direct attack on 
th^ III 967 deed. By not addressing the applicability of the discovery rule, Donald and 
Je^ifette have left these arguments undisputed and un-rebutted, and this Court, based on 
th0 pnefing before it, should rule in favor of the Petitioners, upholding the ruling of the 
tri^l|court, and reversing the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
IT. THE CORRECT STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR THE IMPOSITION 
OF A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST IS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
STANDARD, 
Donald and Jeanette make the novel argument that "the decision regarding 
whether the facts warrant the imposition of a constructive trust is a legal conclusion, 
reviewed for correctness." This argument is incorrect. 
To support this idea, Donald and Jeanette cite to two cases relied upon by the 
Petitioners which state that the "availability" of a remedy is a legal conclusion reviewed 
for correctness, but the "application" of equitable remedies is reviewed for an abuse of 
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discretion. "[T]he availability of an equitable remedy is reviewed for correctness but that 
the trial court's application and formulation of an equitable remedy is reviewed for abuse 
of discretion." Ockey v. Lehmer 2008 UT 37, ^ 42 n. 38, 189 P.3d 51 (emphasis in 
original); See also, Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1040-41 (Utah 1995). 
Donald and Jeanette's argument on this issue seems to stem from their confusion 
as to the meaning of the availability of a remedy as opposed to the meaning of the 
applicability of a remedy. 
Under availability, the analysis is whether the remedy sought by the plaintiff 
would be available under the law, assuming that the allegations made in the pleadings are 
true. In other words, do the facts alleged, if true, make the sought for remedy available to 
the plaintiff? The question of availability is in fact a legal conclusion, because it assumes 
that facts exist, and presents a legal analysis of whether the assumed facts can support the 
elements of a legal theory. Thus, legal analysis, not fact finding, is the pivotal issue and 
district courts decisions regarding availability of a remedy are reviewed for correctness. 
Under applicability, the analysis is whether the facts as proven at trial apply to the 
legal elements of the equitable remedy sought for by the plaintiff and "formulated" by the 
trial court. In other words, does the actual evidence satisfy the requirements of and apply 
to the equitable remedy? Fact finding and the exercise of a trial court's equitable powers 
are the pivotal endeavors in applying facts to equitable remedies and thus the 
applicability of remedies is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 
Thus, Donald and Jeanette's reading of Ockey and Thurston is mistaken. Both 
cases clearly state that the "availability of an equitable remedy is reviewed for 
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correctness" but that the "application and formulation of an equitable remedy is reviewed 
for abuse of discretion." Ockey, 2008 UT 37, % 42; Thurston, 892 P.2d at 1040-41. Both 
Tolman and Neilsen support this conclusion, and both indicate that the imposition of a 
constructive trust is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Tolman v. 
Winchester Hills Water Co., Inc., 912 P.2d 457, 462 (Utah App. 1996); Nielsen v. 
Nielsen, 2000 UT App 37, 2000 WL 33249399 (unpublished opinion, see Appendix to 
Masterson Parties' opening brief). 
In the present case, Donald and Jeanette have not argued that under the facts 
previously alleged by the Petitioners a constructive trust is not an available remedy. 
Rather, Donald and Jeanette have challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and the 
findings of fact as entered by the trial court as well as the application and formulation of 
an equitable constructive trust by the trial court as incorrect. Consistent with Ockey, 
Thurston, Tolman and Neilsen, the trial court's imposition of a constructive trust in this 
case had to be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. The Court of Appeals' 
failure to observe this rule, and to review the imposition of a constructive trust as a matter 
of correctness, was error, which requires the reversal of the decision of the Court of 
Appeals and reinstatment of the ruling of the trial court. 
2
 Donald and Jeanette have accused counsel for the Masterson Parties of violating their 
duty of candor towards the courts by not anticipating and raising Donald and Jeanette's 
new, novel and legally incorrect arguments regarding the applicable standard of review. 
This accusation is simply inappropriate. See Standard 3, Utah Standards of 
Professionalism and Civility (stating u[l]awyers shall not, without adequate factual basis, 
attribute to other counsel or the court improper motives, purpose, or conduct"). 
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VI. BECAUSE APPELLEES REPEATEDLY ASSAILED THE 
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE, THEY WERE REQUIRED TO 
MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE IN FAVOR OF THE TRIAL COURT'S 
RULING. 
Donald and Jeanette argue that they had no duty to marshal the evidence before 
the Court of Appeals because they did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence but 
rather the legal conclusions of the trial court. A simple review of Donald and Jeanette's 
briefs before the Court of Appeals reveals the falsity of this argument. On page 1 of 
Donald and Jeanette's opening brief to the Court of Appeals, as their second Issue 
Presented for Review, Donald and Jeanette ask "Was there sufficient evidence presented 
below to warrant the imposition of a constructive trust?" Based on this statement alone, 
it is astonishing that Donald and Jeanette now assert that they "didn't challenge the trial 
court's findings, but rather its legal conclusions." (Appellees" Brief, page 13). The 
striking disparity between these two statements is irreconcilable. 
Not only was one of the Issues Presented for Review before the Court of Appeals 
a direct challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's findings, 
but Donald and Jeanette peppered their briefs before the Court of Appeals with 
allegations that there was "no evidence" to support the trial court's findings imposing a 
constructive trust. On the issue of a confidential relationship, Donald and Jeanette 
repeatedly stated before the Court of Appeals that there was "no evidence" on the issue. 
(Donald and Jeanette's Opening Brief before the Court of Appeals, pages 8-9). Donald 
and Jeanette also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to meet the burden of proof, 
arguing that the "clear thrust of the evidence" did not support the trial court's findings. 
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(Id. at 12). In Donald and Jeanette's reply brief before the Court of Appeals, Donald and 
Jeanette continued to argue that there was an "absence of evidence" to support the trial 
court's imposition of a constructive trust. (Donald and Jeanette's Reply Brief before the 
Court of Appeals, page 6). In the face of these evidentiary challenges before the Court of 
Appeals, it is bewildering that Donald and Jeanette would now assert that they did not 
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence below. 
Because Donald and Jeanette did in fact challenge the trial court's findings and the 
sufficiency of the evidence below, Donald and Jeanette had the duty to marshal all of the 
evidence in favor of the trial court's ruling and, after presenting this "magnificent array" 
of evidence to the Court of Appeals, Donald and Jeanette should have "ferret[ed] out a 
fatal flaw in the evidence" to show why the trial court's findings were "clearly 
erroneous". West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 
1991); Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 1051, 1052-
53 (Utah 1994). Because Donald and Jeanette failed to fulfill their marshalling duty, the 
Court of Appeals should have "affirmed the [trial] court's findings on that basis alone." 
State v. Widdison. 2001 UT 60, \ 60, 28 P.3d 1278. 
CONCLUSION 
As demonstrated, the decision of the Court of Appeals violates precedent and 
reaches a decision which does not conform with the findings of fact. Donald and 
Jeanette's arguments against the trial court's ruling and in favor of the decision of the 
Court of Appeals are unavailing. Because the Court of Appeals fails to construe the 
findings of fact in favor of the trial court's ruling, and instead takes one phrase of the 
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ruling out of context and misinterprets it; because the findings of fact, when read 
correctly, establish that legal and equitable titles were intended to be divided and an 
express trust established in favor of the family; because the Court of Appeals limits and 
narrowly defines the doctrine of constructive trusts; because the Court of Appeals fails to 
find an abuse of discretion; because the Court of Appeals examines the evidence and 
finds clear error when the evidence had not been marshaled; because the Court of 
Appeals fails to remand the case to the trial court after changing the legal standard; 
because the evidence satisfies the requirements for the imposition of a constructive trust, 
either on express or equitable grounds; and because the discovery rule operates to toll the 
statute of limitations until the trust was repudiated, the decision of the Court of Appeals 
was in error. For these reasons the decision of the Court of Appeals must be reversed and 
the ruling of the trial court upheld. 
DATED and SIGNED t h i s ^ ^ t f e y of July, 2009. 
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C. 
M. Dayle Jeffs 
^ ^ 4 ^ 
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